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Abstract The European Union started the introduction of
competition in the European market for natural gas. Today,
mid-2016, the process of restructuring is still going on. In
parallel, important changes in geopolitical, environmental
and technological determinants can be observed in the
European and global energy and gas markets. These changes
have been highly influential in generating ‘reactive’ policies in
the European Union, both in Brussels as well as in theMember
States. The evolution of the European natural gas policy cre-
ating a strongly regulated version of a ‘well-functioning’ gas
market remains a highly politicized and instable experiment.
The values attached to natural gas are constantly shifting be-
tween the economics, to security of supply and sustainability.
Moreover, the importance attached to these values and their
operationalization are different in the various parts of Europe.
Therewith, the creation of ‘well-functioning’ EU gas market
will always remain a politicized and never ending story.
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Introduction
Nearly 20 years ago, the European Union started the introduc-
tion of competition in the European market for natural gas.
Thereupon, a process unfolded which has radically changed
the gas market in terms of its organization and coordination
and the role—or even the presence—of specific types of ac-
tors involved.
Today, mid 2016, the process of restructuring is still going
on. The claim that ‘the market’ needs further developments is
a recurrent message, and on a regular basis, new rules, regu-
lations and interventions are announced. Initially, it was ar-
gued that these problems were a consequence of delays in the
process of market restructuring. The continued exercise of
market power by producers and wholesale and retail compa-
nies was keeping the EU gas market from fulfilling its func-
tion as an efficient system of coordination. Indeed, competi-
tion between a variety of suppliers has evolved mainly in
north-west Europe, whereas other regions are still supplied
by one single supplier, Russia, or at best by a few. The solution
is seen in creating more competition by deeper restructuring, a
more stringent overview and control on the behaviour of mar-
ket actors and a more effective regulation of the transport and
storage infrastructure [1].
In parallel, important changes can be observed in the
European and global energy and gas markets and in the world
in which these markets exist. First of all, in geopolitical terms,
the EU has been expanded, incorporating new Member States
in central Europe that formerly where members of theWarsaw
Pact. Moreover, the formerly Soviet republics have gained
independence and are playing out their own political and en-
ergy strategies; either or not influenced by internal struggles.
Secondly, in terms of energy and environmental policy, the
increasingly widespread acceptation of global warming as a
consequence of the use of fossil energy resources has altered
the preferences and priorities in respect of energy supply in the
EU countries. Thirdly, in terms of technological development,
the rapid maturing of both the LNG technology and uncon-
ventional gas (and oil) production has substantially altered the
This article is part of the Topical Collection on Midstream Sector
* Aad Correljé
A.F.Correlje@tudelft.nl
1 Faculty Technology, Policy and Management/Clingendael
International Energy Programme, TU Delft University of
Technology, Delft, Netherlands
Curr Sustainable Renewable Energy Rep (2016) 3:28–34
DOI 10.1007/s40518-016-0048-y
local availability of gas resources and their transportability.
Particularly, the latter has had an impact in economically
connecting the world’s three main continental gas markets:
America, Eurasia and southwest Asia [2, 3].
As will be shown below, changes in these geopolitical,
environmental and technological determinants have been
highly influential in generating ‘reactive’ policies in the
European Union, both in Brussels as well as in the Member
States. In the meantime, the overall energy and gas market
policy objectives remain framed into the particular EU con-
ception of how a ‘well-functioning’ market can be created in
an industry that at least partially exhibits the characteristics of
a natural monopoly [4].
This raises the interesting question to what extent the cur-
rent European gas policy is able to continue on the path of,
primarily, creating a ‘well-functioning’ gas market by means
of a more or less constant regulatory intervention. This, while
in the second row, all kinds of changes are taking place that
alter the evaluation of important values attached to natural gas
as a main energy input in the European economy, security of
supply, sustainability and the economics of gas supply. It is
important to note that in the different parts of Europe these
values are valued differently.
Below, we firstly will address a number of fundamental
characteristics of the gas industry. Subsequently, we will out-
line briefly how the restructuring of the European gas market
has taken shape, in the subsequent directives and interventions
of the EUCommission. Thereupon, we will briefly discuss the
structural changes in the European gas market and the global
energy context. We conclude with a discussion on the interac-
tion of these aspects and the consequence for gas in Europe.
The Gas Market
The natural gas industry consists of three main segments. Up-
stream the exploration and the production of gas takes place.
The mid-stream segment involves the transport of the gas to
the local distribution grids and the large scale industrial users
and power plants. On a continental scale, generally, the gas is
transported via high pressure transmission pipelines. Overseas
the gas is transported in tankers as LNG. Gas can be stored in
salt caverns or in depleted gas fields. Down-stream the local
distribution grids deliver the gas to small domestic and busi-
ness consumers.
The development, the operation and the exploitation of
these production, transport, distribution and storage systems
are complex and risky activities. In the first place, they require
large investments; capital expenditure involves the lion’s
share of the overall cost. Secondly, the assets involved are
highly specific; once constructed at some location, they can-
not be removed or used for alternative purposes when either
the supply or the demand of gas would come to a halt. These
costs are literarily ‘sunk’. Thirdly, all parties are locked into
some degree of inter-dependency vis-à-vis each other.
Pipelines, LNG facilities and storages form indispensable es-
sential facilities to producers, traders and end-users. So, ac-
cess conditions to these facilities are a key determinant in the
functioning of the supply systems and the economic well-
being of the parties involved.
In this respect, volume and price risk are crucial. Gas pro-
ducers and infrastructure operators will only generate a prof-
itable return when their assets are used at a reasonable rate of
throughput and at revenues that cover their costs over the
longer term. They need security of demand. The consumers,
by investing in specific gas-fired appliances and installations,
are committed to using gas. They need security of supply,
obviously at a price which is acceptable in the light of the cost
of alternative sources of energy.
Generally, because of these circumstances and because
of the economy scale associated with their technical and
spatial characteristics, gas systems have been considered as
natural monopolies, in which competition was not feasible
[5]. In the past, the economic concepts of market
imperfections, market failure and public goods have led
governments to intervene and to regulate the industry, to
ensure the public interest and the economic stability of the
industry. In those countries where gas was produced, the
public interest associated with resource management was
an additional argument for state intervention [6].
In the USA, private firms in the production, the transport
and the retail segment were regulated by the federal authorities
and by the states [7, 8]. In Europe, public coordination gener-
ally took the shape of direct state intervention. International
gas transmission and wholesale trade were undertaken by
joint-ventures between gas producers and national and local
authorities, while local distribution networks and retail trade
were managed by municipal gas companies. Commercial
transactions and market coordination were organized by
means of long-term contracts, including take-or-pay and des-
tination clauses, under which the gas price was linked to oil
products as the main substitutes for gas, while the gas pro-
ducers received their revenues according to the net-back prin-
ciple. The net-back principle implies that producers (and the
governments) receive a residual amount, after all costs have
been paid for. In this context, public finance and economic
coordination were important facets. Gas production and sales
were subject to intricate regimes for exploration and production
and tax collection. Often gas pricing was used as an instrument
for regional and sectoral economic stimulation [9–12].
Restructuring the EU Gas Market
As from the end of the 1970s onwards, such forms of public
intervention and market coordination were increasingly
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criticized, initially mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world. ‘Rolling
back the state’ á la Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and
the introduction of competition would allow for a more effi-
cient provision of energy, water, public transport and other
public services. The European Community, in 1985, adopted
the Single European Market a general strategy for liberaliza-
tion of the EU economy, followed in 1988 by ‘The Internal
Energy Market’ [13], which advocated a similar restructuring
in the energymarkets. The primary argument was to dismantle
the impediments to intra-communitarian trade in goods and
services, but also the neo-liberal outlook on competition and
efficiency and business interests played an important role [14].
On this basis, gradually, a perspective unfolded for a
European gas market in which competition was to be created
between gas producers and suppliers in the up-stream segment
and between traders in the wholesale and retail segment. To
this end, it was envisaged that the traditional long-term con-
tracts would give way to short-term transactions. Scarcity con-
ditions would determine the market price, thus balancing the
supply and demand for gas. It was expected that liquid spot
markets would arise in those places where different sources of
supply would connect with demand. A precondition for this
was that the competing traders would be given access to the
essential facilities in transport, distribution and storage, to
reach their customers. To this end, three basic regulatory prin-
ciples were embraced in Europe.
Firstly, the essential facilities would have to be ‘unbundled’
from the production and trading activities, in the sense that the
operators of such facilities would not have any commercial
interest in manipulating the gas flows or in using the market
insight that the operation of their systems would yield them in
any trading activities. In respect of the transmission and dis-
tribution pipelines, over time, an increasingly stringent degree
of legal and managerial unbundling was required. Most of the
networks were separated from the former wholesale compa-
nies and local gas utilities, to be managed as either a transmis-
sion, or distribution, system operator (TSO or DSO). In re-
spect of other facilities, for LNG, storage and conversion,
depending on their position as a (local) monopoly in a ‘rele-
vant’ market, different regimes were allowed with possible
exemptions from third party access requirements, to be
awarded on a case-by-case basis.
The second principle involved the provision of ‘un-dis-
criminatory access’ for trading parties to these essential facil-
ities. This, obviously, not only involved access to the transport
systems but also to storage, LNG and quality conversion fa-
cilities when needed. Initially, this was arranged by means of
relatively simple ‘first come–first served’ contracts, under
which traders could book a specific amount of capacity for a
specific time slot, at a specific tariff to be paid to the operator.
Yet, over time, in several steps, an increasingly complex ap-
proach developed. Access to the transmission pipelines, gen-
erally, came to be organized as a so-called entry-exit model in
which ‘shippers’ of gas book their entry and exit rights, for
specific volumes of gas to be fed in or taken out of the trans-
port system at specific locations [15].
The essence of this model is that it abstracts from the
actual routes that the gas molecules take to their destina-
tion. Therewith, it provides maximal flexibility to shippers
in buying and selling to market parties at no matter what
location. Entry and exit tariffs at specific locations are
equal for all shippers. In respect of the distribution net-
works, generally the so-called postage stamp tariffs are
applied, in which a seller books his entry in a given zone,
where his client is located, at a pre-specified tariff. Access
conditions to other facilities depend on their status as being
exempted or not; either their owners or operators have to
provide access to any interested users at pre-specified con-
ditions, or they are allowed to determine how they use their
capacity themselves.
An important element in providing access, in combination
with the tariff structure, is the allocation of the capacity avail-
able to the interested shippers. Starting out with simple first
come–first serve rules, a complex set of mechanisms was de-
veloped in order, on the one hand, to maximally expand the
use of the physically limited capacity available by as much
shippers as possible, thus reducing so-called contractual con-
gestion. On the other hand, the objective became to efficiently
award scarce capacity to those shippers who put the highest
value on that capacity. Therefore, a variety of procedures for
the tendering and secondary trading capacity and the re-
allocation of un-used capacities was developed. The underly-
ing objective was to enable the shippers to match the com-
modity transactions they arranged in the gas market, with the
appropriate handling arrangements to move it to their clients
or storage facilities. This would enhance the functioning of the
gas market and facilitate a maximally efficient allocating of
volumes of gas at market prices, reflecting its value to pro-
ducers and consumers.
A third principle, involved the notion that the gas infra-
structure inherited from the traditional gas industry still
reflected the consequences of its natural monopoly status.
Main elements in this respect were ‘gold plated’ over-
investment in assets, high operational costs, high tariffs that
did not reflect the actual, economically efficient, costs of
transport, and awkward practices in discriminating the differ-
ent types of consumers and regions. To lower the cost of the
infrastructure, tariff and/or revenue regulation would have to
force the TSOs and DSOs to become more efficient in their
operations and the use of their system. Eventually, this
evolved into a wide variety of price cap, yardstick, or RPI-X
regulation. To this end, each Member State had to establish a
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for the energy sector,
with the responsibility to approve and control the tariffs (or
methodologies) to ensure non-discriminatory access to the
unbundled networks.
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Implementation
After some preliminary attempts in the early 1990s, this liberal
concept for a gas market was implemented in several steps.
With three consecutive Gas Directives ([16–18]) the European
Commission provided increasingly explicit and stringent
rules, to be implemented by the Member States. Particularly,
the 2009 Directive, also called the Third Package, was impor-
tant in the sense that it unified the different national ap-
proaches. This was a reaction to the ‘Sector Enquiry’ carried
by the Commission’s Directorate-General Competition [19],
in which it concluded that lack of access to the infrastructure
and dominant positions of only a few companies were
blocking the development of a well-functioning gas market.
Another important element emanating from of the Third
Package was the enhanced EU-wide cooperation. As regards
the NRAs, in 2009, the Commission established the Agency
for the Cooperation of National Energy Regulators (ACER).
Since March 2000, the regulators had been cooperating vol-
untarily in the Council of European Energy Regulators
(CEER), working together with the European Regulators
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) established by the
Commission. To fill the regulatory vacuum in cross-border
situations and to facilitate EU-wide regulatory coordination,
ACER was set up to align national market and network oper-
ation rules and facilitate investment in trans-European infra-
structure. Also the unbundled national TSOs, in 2009, en-
gaged in EU-wide cooperation in the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) in the
promotion of cross-border gas trade and development of the
European transmission network, for example, by providing a
10-year gas network development plan.
The results of the enhanced EU-wide cooperation were that
further steps were taken towards achieving a ‘frictionless’
cross-border trade of gas in the EU by the gas target model
(GTM) initiative (see [20–22]). The GTM is meant to provide
cross-border linkages between the national or regional entry/
exit areas, implying that instantaneous supply and demand
will determine the price of gas in the area, as in a virtual spot
market. The delivery of long-term contracted volumes of gas
will then take place at the borders of the entry/exit area,
forming the market price, also being influenced by occasional
inter-area volumes purchased on a short-term basis.
Security of Supply
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, concerns about
the security of gas supply were put on the agenda. In 2004, a
Directive (2004/67/EC) was adopted, aiming to establish a
common framework for the Member States security-of-
supply policies, consistent with the requirements of a single
gas market. The disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006
and 2009 caused supply problems in central south-eastern
Europe and led to the adoption of a new regulation (994/
2010). This regulation sought to harmonize national measures
and introduced common minimum standards for prepared-
ness, to enhance the solidarity between states in case of a
crisis.
As the tensions between Russia, the Ukraine and the EU
continued to increase, in 2014, a so-called stress test was un-
dertaken; security of gas supply and recently (in 2016) a draft
proposal for a more extensive security of supply regulation
was published. This draft addresses the industry, the
Member States grouped in specific regions, as being respon-
sible for safeguarding the supply to protected customers, and
the European Commission in charge of general coordination
and consistency. The draft highlights a stronger cooperation in
regional preventive action plans and emergency plans.
Moreover, it proposes an infrastructure standard, which guar-
antees the possibility of supplying gas even if the largest in-
frastructure is not available, while enabling permanent bi-
directional transmission capacity [23].
Gas in the Energy Union Policy
In February 2015, the Commission announced its Energy
Union policy in which it announced a fundamental transfor-
mation of Europe’s energy system. In the light of an ambitious
EU climate policy, it aims to give EU consumers secure, sus-
tainable, competitive and affordable energy [24]. Main com-
ponents of this policy are as follows: (1) energy security, sol-
idarity and trust; (2) a fully integrated European energy mar-
ket; (3) energy efficiency contributing to moderation of de-
mand; (4) decarbonising the economy and (5) research, inno-
vation and competitiveness. It is stated that the EU has ‘to
move away from an economy driven by fossil fuels, an econ-
omy where energy is based on a centralized, supply-side ap-
proach and which relies on old technologies and outdated
business models.’ ([1]: 2).
Observations and objectives as regards the role of gas are
mainly formulated under the heading of Energy security, sol-
idarity and trust, with a strong focus on the need to diversify
energy sources, suppliers and transport routes. Key elements
are as follows: firstly, the development of a Southern Gas
Corridor to enable central Asian countries to deliver gas to
Europe; secondly, the establishment of liquid gas hubs with
multiple suppliers in northern Europe, as well as in central and
eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area; thirdly, the con-
struction of additional transport infrastructure, supported by
community funding instruments European financial institu-
tions; fourthly, the preparation of an LNG strategy to provide
for back-up in crisis situations and including the transport
infrastructure connecting LNG access points and the creation
of gas storages in Europe. Finally, as regards the domestic
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energy production to reduce import dependence, the plan re-
fers ‘notably’ to renewables, needed for decarbonisation, as
well as conventional and—for those Member States that
choose it—unconventional oil and gas ‘provided that issues
of public acceptance and environmental impact are adequately
addressed’ ([1]: 5).
Developments in the Gas Market
Parallel to the implementation of the consecutive gas direc-
tives, and particularly since the turn of the century, important
economic and political changes have taken place on the sup-
ply as well as on the demand side of the European gas market
and in the international gas market. These developments have
considerably altered the context in which the European gas
market functions.
On the supply side, the European indigenous gas reserves,
in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany, and France and Italy
are slowly but surely in decline. In the Netherlands, moreover,
gas production-induced earthquakes in the huge Groningen
field have forced the government to limit the annual produc-
tion to 24 Bcm; about half the amount it produced in 2013.
Apart from Norway, the potential for supply expansion is
minimal within the EU area. The role of unconventional gas
seems limited in Europe, as a consequence of popular resis-
tance and, possibly, the regulatory difficulties in creating ade-
quate infrastructures.
Current European gas imports are mainly transported via
pipelines from Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya, being pro-
duced at fields that were taken in production in the 1980s.
These imports are governed by the traditional long-term con-
tracts, although both Norway and Russia do accept renegoti-
ations of the main parameters, in order to keep their supply
competitive versus potential alternative suppliers. Although
there is a definite potential to expand the supply capacity of
these countries and to bring new reserves on-stream, this will
require huge investments in production and transport mission
facilities. These fields are more remote and expensive to de-
velop than the traditional field, as they are located in ‘difficult’
areas in Russia and off-shore Norway in the North Atlantic.
New potential pipeline gas suppliers are located to the
south-east of Europe, in countries like Turkmenistan,
Kurdistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and the East Mediterranean area,
involving Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. Yet, most of these supply
options face complex political circumstances, either because
of internal instabilities or conflictive international relations.
Also the transit issue is at stake here, particularly in respect
of the position of Turkey, but also regarding the many other
states involved. These complexities, including the relations
with Russia, have hampered the construction of any pipelines
in the Southern corridor, so far.
An option that is often proclaimed as the ‘ideal’ solution to
Europe’s energy and gas dependency is the evolving global
LNG market. A huge growth has taken place the LNG supply
potential from traditional and new reserves, particularly in the
wake of the US shale gas revolution. This gas could be
imported into the EUmarket via LNG re-gasification capacity
along the European shores.
Also on the demand-side, the situation has changed signif-
icantly. Initially, the use of gas in Europe was growing slowly
in those countries in Europe where gas is a traditionally im-
portant source of energy. In other countries, like Spain, gas
was a relatively new fuel; rapidly gaining market share and
raising great expectations, because of the advantageous envi-
ronmental aspects, the comfort it provides and economic ad-
vantages. So in the early twenty-first century, the perspective
for natural gas in Europe was bright. Yet, over time, the future
perspective for natural gas has considerably weakened.
A main reason has been the post-2008 economic downturn
that has caused an overall decline in the use of gas. Although
the European economy is not growing fast anyway, it remains
to be seen how much of this demand may return in the future.
Particularly over the recent past, and definitely after the Paris
agreements in December 2015, the public image of natural gas
has weakened. Undeniably, the policies of some European
countries, like Germany [4] and Spain, have stimulated the
emergence of a huge potential of wind and solar power.
To an increasing extent, gas is considered a ‘dirty’ fossil
fuel. In terms of its position in future energy scenarios, the role
of gas as the ‘bridging fuel towards sustainability’ has lost
credibility. This may have been a consequence of the wide-
spread aversion of local communities against shale gas and
‘fracking’. In the Netherlands, the induced earthquakes in
the huge Groningen field are generating a growing resistance
against gas in general, including the exploration of other much
smaller occurrences.
Shale gas extraction in the USA is also indirectly influential
in the EU gas market. As a consequence of the substitution of
low-cost unconventional gas for coal in the USA, low cost
coal has become available to the EU power sector. Hence,
even in the traditional gas consuming power sectors in the
EU, coal has become the fuel of preference, driving gas out
of the merit order.
Conclusions
The changes above have important consequences and affect
the prevailing perspective of what constitutes a ‘well-func-
tioning’ EU gas market. First of all, we observe a continuous
drive towards the creation of a competitive gas market by
means of sector regulation, as regards the increasingly
unbundled pipeline, storage and LNG infrastructure, and by
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means of competition policy, as regards the dominant posi-
tions of large suppliers and traders in the industry.
The implication is that investments in new supply infrastruc-
tures are strongly dependent on, on the one hand, investor’s and
TSO’s expectations of their usability in the light of future gas
flows, and on the other, on regulatory decision-making. In re-
spect of the huge requirements in transport, storage and LNG
infrastructure emanating from the objectives to internally secure
the gas supply to regions and to connect liquid market areas, as
outlined in the Energy Union plan, it looks unlikely that private
parties are willing to provide the required investments.
As regards the interest of producers and traders in supply-
ing gas to the EU market, both demand and price expectations
play a crucial role. In respect of the demand side, we have
explained that the expectations regarding the future use of gas
are highly uncertain because of the ambitious objective to
move away from fossil fuels, the more or less steady state of
the European economy and, at least currently, the disadvan-
tage of gas in power generation, in competition with zero-
marginal cost renewable and low cost coal.
As regards the supply-side, we have suggested that apart
from the traditional suppliers, including Russia and Norway,
there are only meagre alternatives present for pipeline sup-
plies, as a consequence of the political instability in many
potential producing countries and transit troubles.
Indigenous supply is being depleted. This leaves LNG as the
main option for future supply, either via reliable long-term
contracts when that may prove feasible or via spot cargos at
the world market price. The former arrangement, however,
requires certainty of demand to justify the required invest-
ments and the willingness to pay the price. Both requirements
are not easily met in the current context. The latter arrange-
ment carries a risk. On the current over supplied gas market,
the price is low. Yet, that may change.
Probably the main insight of this longer term perspective
over the evolution of the European natural gas policy is that a
strongly regulated version of a ‘well-functioning’ gas market
remains a highly politicized and instable experiment. As stated
in the introduction, and illustrated in the sections above, the
values attached to natural gas as a source of energy in the
European economy are constantly shifting between the eco-
nomics, to security of supply and sustainability. Moreover, the
importance attached to these values and their operationalization
will be different in the various parts of Europe. Therewith, the
creation of ‘well-functioning’ gas market will always remain a
highly politicized and never ending story.
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